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Chapter 9
Money-Back Guarantees in Individual
Pension Accounts: Evidence from
the German Pension Reform
Raimond Maurer and Christian Schlag
The German Retirement Saving Act (‘‘Altersvermögensgesetz’’1) which
passed the German legislative body in May of 2001 instituted a new funded
system of supplementary pensions coupled with a general reduction in the
level of state pay-as-you-age pensions. The goal of this new pension system is
to cap and to stabilize the contributions of German employees to the state
pension system, which cost 19.1 percent of salary. For compulsory members
of the state pension systems not already in retirement, the maximum ‘‘first
pillar’’ state pension level will be gradually cut from 70 to 67 percent of the
last net salary before retirement by 2030.2 To compensate for the cut in
state pension payouts, individuals will be able to invest voluntarily and on a
pre-tax basis a part of their income in individual pension accounts (‘‘Alters-
vorsorgevertrag,’’ called here IPAs).3 Additional incentives to invest into the
IPAs are given by the government in the form of a tax relief on pension con-
tributions, direct subsidies for low income earners, and extra contributions
for children. In order to get the full benefits, households will have to invest
about 1 percent of their income (up to the social security ceiling) into the
pension system in 2002, increasing every 2 years by 1 percent reaching a
maximum of 4 percent in 2008. The investment income during the accu-
mulation period is not subject to income tax, whereas the payments from
the IPA during the distribution phase will be fully subject to income tax.
In general, individuals are free to make IPA pension investments in a
wide array of products offered by private sector financial institutions. This
allows participants to choose an investment portfolio that is consistent with
their individual preferences for risk and return. In order to qualify for a
tax credit, however, the IPA products have to satisfy a number of criteria.
This research is part of the Research Program ‘‘Institutional Investors’’ of the Center for Fin-
ancial Studies, Frankfurt/M. This chapter was written in part during Dr. Maurer’s time as
the Metzler Visiting Professor at the Wharton’s School Pension Research Council. The authors
would like to thank Manfred Laux, David McCarthy, Olivia S. Mitchell, Alex Muermann, Rudolf
Siebel, Wolfgang Raab, and Kent Smetters for helpful comments. Opinions and errors are solely
those of the authors.
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These conditions are codified in a special law concerning the certification
of individual pension products (‘‘Altersvorsorge-Zertifizierungsgesetz’’) and
supervised by a special authority (‘‘Zertifizierungsstelle’’) belonging to
the German Federal Financial Supervisory Agency. The intention of the
certification requirements is twofold:
1. First, the government wants to ensure that individuals only use the
(tax-supported) accumulated savings for a lifelong income stream
in the post-retirement phase, and not for consumption during pre-
retirement.
2. Second, private (and often uninformed) investors paying into the new
individual pension plans should be protected against the risk of making
‘‘too bad’’ investment decisions.
In the spirit of the first intention, investments in the personal pension
accounts must be preserved until employees reach the age of 60,4 and
no distributions may be made during the accumulation period. When the
age of retirement is reached, the accumulated assets must be drawn down
in the form of a lifelong annuity or a capital withdrawal plan which must
(partly) revert into an annuity at the age of 85.5 To provide transparency, the
providers of IPAs must disclose the nature and level of fees (e.g. to cover dis-
tribution and/or administrative costs). If distribution fees are not charged
as a percentage of the periodic contribution into the plan, they must be
spread equally over a period of at least 10 years.6 During the accumulation
phase, the policyholder has the right to suspend the contract as well as to
terminate the contract by switching the cash value of the policy to a new
provider.
In line with a certain minimum level of investor protection, only regulated
financial institutions, like banks, life insurance companies, and mutual fund
companies, are allowed to offer IPAs. In principle, these providers are free to
design their IPA. In particular, the Certification Act imposes no restrictions
concerning the assets in which the providers invest the contribution that
back the pension accounts.7 In addition, the supervisory authority does not
check whether the risk and return characteristics of an IPA are ‘‘economic-
ally feasible.’’ Yet, the provider of an IPA must promise the plan participant
that the contract cash value at retirement is at least equal to contributions
made to the IPAs, including all extra payments by the government.8 This
‘‘money-back’’ guarantee, which was the core of an intense and controver-
sial debate during the social security reform in Germany, is the focus of this
chapter. Advocates of the guarantee argue that it protects plan participants
against a portion of the downside volatility of capital market returns, by
providing them with a minimum rate of return with respect to their lifetime
contributions. However, the guarantee shapes the design of saving products
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offered by the providers and raises a question about the economic costs of
such a promise.9 Depending on the assets used to back the pension accounts,
providers may be exposed to shortfall risk due to adverse movements in cap-
ital markets. If, at retirement, the value of the pension assets is lower than
the sum of the contributions paid into the plan, the IPA provider must fill
the gap with its own equity capital. The problem faced by money managers
is therefore to find a product design, in conjunction with an appropriate
investment strategy, that protects the credibility of the guarantee in scenarios
of negative investment returns (hedging effectiveness), while still allowing
for sufficient upside potential if capital markets are booming (and thus
avoiding excessive hedging costs). In addition, the guarantee has important
implications for regulators who must find an effective and efficient solvency
system for such saving schemes, especially for mutual funds.
The objective of this chapter is to explore how this money-back guarantee
works for products offered by the German mutual fund industry. We evalu-
ate alternative designs for guarantee structures including a life cycle model
(dynamic asset allocation), a plan with a pre-specified blend of equity and
bond investments (static asset allocation), and some type of portfolio insur-
ance. We use simulation to compare hedging effectiveness and hedging
costs associated with the provision of the money-back guarantee.
Long-Term and Shortfall Risks, and
Return of Saving Plans
In order to make appropriate investment decisions under uncertainty, indi-
viduals must be able to compare the risk and rewards of different asset
classes. Yet policymakers, regulators, and providers are also interested in
the long run performance of financial assets that back the new pension
products. The impact of the investment horizon on the risk of the various
financial assets is still a subject of intense and controversial debate within the
academic community and among investment professionals.10 For example,
a popular statement is that stocks have a lower downside side risk in the long
run than in the short run. A practical guideline based on this argument is
that people should invest a higher fraction of their money in stocks the
younger they are, independent of preferences.11 If the time horizon is long
enough, this approach would imply that people should invest 100 percent in
stocks. To justify this view, proponents call on the law of large numbers which
(seemingly) forces a phenomenon called ‘‘time diversification.’’ Intuitively,
this means that over a sufficiently long investment horizon, losses resulting
from the high downside fluctuations will be compensated by gains result-
ing from the high upside fluctuations of short term stock returns. Some
investment advisors press this argument by pointing to historical returns
and demonstrating that stocks have outperformed bonds for every 10-, 15-,
or 20-year period on record.
“chap09” — 2003/6/4 — page 190 — #4
190 Maurer and Schlag
Nevertheless, it is well known in the academic literature that this is a
misleading argument. For example, Samuelson (1963) uses utility theory,
Levy and Cohen (1998) use stochastic dominance, and Bodie (1995, 2001)
applies option pricing theory to demonstrate the logical flaw in this conjec-
ture. In addition, the use of historical return series implies that the 10-, 15-,
or 20-year periods used are strongly overlapping, so the resulting rollover
multiperiod returns have a high degree of correlation, both of which result
in a serious estimation bias.
Shortfall Risk Measures
This section provides additional evidence concerning the impact of the time
horizon on the risk of the major financial asset classes in the German context,
that is, stocks and bonds. To do so, we use alternative shortfall risk measures.
The concept of shortfall risk is associated with the possibility of ‘‘something
bad happening,’’ in other words, falling short compared to a required target
(benchmark) return.12 Returns below the target (losses) are considered to
be undesirable or risky, while returns above the target (gains) are desirable
or non-risky. In this sense, shortfall risk measures are called ‘‘relative’’ or
‘‘pure’’ measures of risk.
A popular measure to examine the downside risk of different investment
vehicles is the shortfall probability. Formally, let R denote the cumulative
(multiyear) return of an investment at a specific point in time. Then the
shortfall probability is given by
SP = Prob(R < z), (9.1)
where z is the target (benchmark) which translates the total investment
returns into gains or losses. In the special case of a money back guarantee,
the target is set equal to zero; that is, the shortfall occurs when the cash value
of the policy is lower than the premiums paid into the saving plan. Despite
the popularity of this risk measure in the investment industry, it has a major
shortcoming. As Bodie (2001: 308) points out it ‘‘completely ignores how
large the potential shortfall might be.’’ If the same investment strategy can
be repeated many times, the shortfall probability only answers the question
‘‘how often’’ a loss might occur, but not ‘‘how bad’’ such a loss might be.
To provide information about the potential extent of a loss, we calculate
the Mean Excess Loss (MEL), also known as the conditional shortfall expecta-
tion, as an additional measure to evaluate the long-term and shortfall risk of
financial assets. Formally, this risk index is given by
MEL = E[z − R |R < z], (9.2)
and it indicates the expected loss with respect to the benchmark, under the
condition that a shortfall occurs. Therefore, given a loss, the MEL answers
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the question ‘‘how bad on average’’ the loss will be.13 In this sense, the MEL
can be considered a worst case risk measure, since the measure only con-
siders the consequences of the mean shortfall-level assuming that a shortfall
happens.
A shortfall risk measure which connects the probability and the extent of
the conditional shortfall in an intuitive way is the shortfall expectation (SE):
SE = E[max(z − R , 0)] = SP × MEL (9.3)
The shortfall expectation is the sum of losses weighted by their probab-
ilities, and hence it is a measure of the unconditional ‘‘average loss.’’ As
equation (9.3) shows, the mean shortfall level is simply the product of the
shortfall probability and the mean level of shortfall, given the occurrence of
a shortfall. In addition, the SE is, in a certain way, related to the price of an
insurance contract which would cover the shortfall. For example, the pro-
vider may have the possibility of transferring the shortfall risk to the capital
market by using appropriate arbitrage-free put options. Then the shortfall
expectation between the cash value of the pension assets and the guarantee
payment with respect to the risk adjusted (‘‘martingale’’) probabilities dis-
counted back at the risk-free interest rate, results in the (modified) Black
and Scholes (1973) option pricing formula.14 If the provider transfers the AQ: Black
and Scholes
(1973) not
listed.
shortfall risk to a reinsurance company, the shortfall expectation could be
seen as an important element of an appropriate premium.
Calibration
Next we quantify and compare the shortfall risk (in the sense defined above)
with respect to the preservation of principal of two saving plans. The first
invests the contribution into stock index fund units, represented by the
German stock index (DAX). The other saving plan is based on bond index
fund units, represented by the German bond index (REXP). The DAX
stands for an index portfolio of German blue chips, and the REXP represents
portfolio of German government bonds. Each of these indices is adjusted
for capital gains as well as dividends and coupon payments (on a pre-tax
basis). We assume a series of equal contributions paid at the beginning of
each month up to the end of the accumulation period, which ranges from
1 to 20 years.
To gain information about the relevant risk measures, we employ an ex ante
approach by imposing an exogenous structure on the probability distribu-
tion governing the uncertainty of future asset returns. With such a model, it
is possible to look into the future and compute the risk measures in which we
are interested. Due to the complexity of the underlying payment structure
of saving plans, there are no analytical closed form expressions for these
risk-measures.15 Therefore we use Monte-Carlo simulation to generate a
large number of paths for the evolution of the saving plans.
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The relevant statistics for the shortfall risk measures are then evaluated on
the basis of these scenarios. The stochastic dynamics of the (uncertain) mar-
ket values of investment fund units are posited to follow geometric Brownian
motion, a standard assumption in financial economics that may be traced
back to Bachelier (1900). This implies that the log-returns of each type of
AQ:
Bachelier
(1900) in
not listed
index fund are independent identically and normally distributed. For the
estimation of the process parameters (drift/diffusion), we use the histor-
ical monthly log-returns of the DAX and REXP over the period January,
1973--December, 2001. The mean log rates of return for stocks (bonds) are
0.7967 percent per month (0.5683 percent p.m.) and the corresponding
standard deviation 5.58 percent p.m. (1.12 percent p.m.). To take potential
administration costs into account, we subtract the equivalent of 0.5 percent
per annum (p.a.) from the monthly average return on the investments.16
Compatible with the prevalent German mutual fund fee structure, we take
marketing costs into consideration by assuming front end sales charges of
5 percent for the stock and 3 percent for the bond fund units.
With respect to these parameters and consistent with the model of a geo-
metric Brownian motion, we generated 3,000,000 random paths for the
development of the pension plan with an investment horizon of 20 years
(240 months).17 For each simulation path i(i = 1, . . . , 3,000,000) we com-
pute for each month t(t = 1, . . . , 240) the (uncertain) compounded
(multiyear) return, that is,
Ri ,t = Vi ,t − PtPt . (9.4)
Here Vi ,t stands for the cash value of the IPA in month t(t = 1, . . . , T ) in
simulation run i(i = 1, . . . , n) and Pt for the sum of contributions paid until
month t . According to the money-back guarantee, we set the benchmark
return equal z = 0. With respect to this target, the relevant risk paramet-
ers are then determined on the basis of the spectrum of possible future
developments.
Results
We start with the results for the development of the expected (multiyear)
return and the shortfall probability of the stock and bond index fund over
time. The graphs in Figure 9-1 indicate that a German investor would have
the potential to receive a substantially higher expected return by investing
in stocks instead of bonds. For example, in the case of stocks at the end of a
20-year accumulation period, the investor can expect a compounded return
with respect to his contributions of 270 percent. For a saving plan based
on bond index funds, the expected return is only 109 percent. However,
purchasing such an investment exposes the plan participant to the volatility
and therefore the downside risk of financial markets.
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Figure 9-1. Expected compounded return of saving plans in stocks and bonds.
(Source : Authors’ Computations.)
0
10
20
30
40
50
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Bonds
Stocks
Time (years)
S
ho
rt
fa
ll 
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
(in
 %
)
Figure 9-2. Shortfall probability against a (nominal) zero percent target rate of return
in stock and bond saving plans (Source : Authors’ Computations.)
Next we illustrate the results for the development of the shortfall probab-
ility of a saving plan using stock and bond index funds over time. Figure 9-2
shows the well-known effect of time diversification, implying that the risk of
not maintaining nominal capital decreases monotonically with an increasing
investment period for bonds and stocks. Yet the rate and the extent of the
risk reduction differ notably between the two investment vehicles. For bond
index funds, the shortfall probability is 37 percent for a yearly investment,
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Figure 9-3. Conditional mean expected loss (MEL) against a (nominal) zero
percent target rate of return in stock and bond saving plans. (Source : Authors’
Computations.)
and close to zero (i.e. lower than 0.1 percent) with an investment horizon of
7 years onwards. By contrast, the shortfall probability of a stock index fund
does not converge as rapidly towards zero. Thus, even for longer time hori-
zons, the shortfall probability remains at a substantial level. For example,
the shortfall probability for a 12-month saving plan is 48.09 percent, and
for accumulation period of 20 years it is still 2.72 percent. In principle,
these results confirm a characteristic which Leibowitz and Krasker (1988)
call persistence of risk.
Corresponding results for the MEL are presented in Figure 9-3. Saving
plans in stocks have an MEL that increases monotonically with the length
of the accumulation period, in contrast to bonds. For example, for an accu-
mulation period of 1 year (i.e. 12 months) the conditional expected loss
is 8.62 percent of the sum of the contribution paid into the stock pen-
sion plan, while for a holding period of 20 years (i.e. 240 months) this
risk index increases to 16.53 percent. For a pension plan using bond index
funds, the MEL is 1.63 percent after 1 year, while for accumulation periods
of 13 years onwards, none of the 3,000,000 simulation paths produces a
shortfall. Hence, with respect to the magnitude of a potential shortfall, the
popular argument that stocks become less risky in the long run is not true.
This result is in line with Samuelson’s (1963) finding concerning the fal-
lacy of the law of large numbers. In addition, these results make clear that
the use of the shortfall probability alone is a misleading risk measure of stock
investments in the long run. The worst-case aspect of a long-term investment
in stocks is partly hidden by only taking the shortfall probability into consid-
eration. Bodie (2002) provided the following very intuitive explanation for
this result ‘‘the probability of a bad thing happening is only part of the risk
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equation. The other part is the severity of that bad thing, and the further out
you go, the more severe it could be.’’ Thus, the elucidation of the worst-case
risk embodied in a long-term investment in stocks represents an additional
piece of information that might be essential for investors.
Figure 9-4 shows how the unconditional shortfall expectation develops
over time. For a saving plan in bond index funds, both the probability of
loss and the mean excess loss decrease with the length of the time horizon.
Because the shortfall expectation measures the net effect of both risk com-
ponents, it is also decreasing in time. For a stock-based saving plan, this risk
measure is also decreasing, that is the decreasing shortfall probability over-
compensates the increasing MEL, to a certain extent. However, in contrast
to bonds, we can observe a risk persistence-characteristic in the stock fund:
even for very long time horizons, the shortfall expectation remains at a
substantial level.
In summary, even for long investment horizons, a pure stock investment
is not free of the downside risk of losing money. Hence it is not possible
to perfectly smoothen the negative short-run fluctuations of stock returns
over long horizons and simultaneously, to keep expected excess returns with
certainty. Consequently, assets with low volatility and low expected returns,
like bonds, are not superfluous in the design of long-term saving products.
Insurance contracts covering the shortfall of a principal guarantees are not
costless for a pure stock investment, even for long investment horizons (see
Lachance and Mitchell, Chapter 8, this volume).
For low volatility assets like a portfolio of government bonds, the prob-
ability and the severity of losing money decreases over time. Over long
investment horizons, the price to insure the downside risk of a principal
guarantee for a pure bonds investment is very low (close to zero). Hence
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bond pension plans are very effective vehicles for producing principal guar-
antees. Of course, this does not mean that with a pure bond pension plan,
the economic costs of downside protection is zero. Providers of bond-based
IPA’s must give up a substantial part of the upside returns that are possible
with stocks. From an ex ante point of view, a measure of these economic
(hedging) costs---in the sense of a smaller upside potential---can be seen as
the difference between the expected return of both investment vehicles.18
Regulatory Framework of Money-Back Guarantees
for IPA: The Case of Mutual Funds
The money-back guarantee as described in the German Certification Act can
be represented as a fixed liability of the provider, when it issues the IPA. If
the cash value of the financial assets backing the liabilities at the beginning
of the retirement phase is lower than the sum of the contributions paid
into the policy, the provider must fill the gap with equity capital. From this
point of view, it is clear that the money-back guarantee should be subject to
solvency regulation.
Saving products offered by commercial banks (e.g. saving accounts) or
insurance companies (e.g. life insurance products) in Germany are usually
designed (at least in part) with fixed interest rates. Nevertheless such is
not the case for mutual funds. The fundamental idea of a collective invest-
ment scheme such as a mutual fund is to collect money from many private
investors via the offering of fund units, and to invest this money in a well-
diversified portfolio of stocks, bonds, and/or real estate. The units of the
mutual fund are liquid in the sense that they are traded on an active sec-
ondary market (e.g. for so-called exchange-traded-funds) or investors can
ask for redemption of their holdings at net-asset value prices, at any point in
time. The investment management company usually assumes no obligation
other than that of investing the funds in a reasonable and prudent man-
ner, solely in the interest of the investors. It provides no guarantees with
respect to a rate of investment return. Hence, the investor bears all capital
market risk and receives the full reward of the financial asset that backs the
mutual fund units. Because the balance sheets of mutual fund providers
are not exposed to financial market fluctuations, they are excluded from
risk-based solvency capital regulation requirements in Germany, in contrast
to insurance companies and commercial banks.19
By contrast, if the provider of an IPA is an investment management
company which uses its own mutual funds, the German Federal Banking
Supervisory Authority (BAKred)20 requires (conditional) solvency capital
because of the statutory ‘‘money back’’ guarantee. This solvency require-
ment, published in December 2001, can be modeled in the following way.
Let Vt denote the cash value of an IPA at time t , and let Pt be the sum of
the contributions (including all extra payments by the government) paid
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into the policy until time t . Furthermore, let rf (t , T ) =: rf ,t be the yield at
time t on a zero coupon bond maturing at time T (i.e. the planned age
of retirement), taken from the current term structure of German interest
rates.
For each IPA, the investment management company must build solvency
capital equal to 8 percent of the total contributions paid into the plan,21
in each period t in which the risk-adjusted cash value of the policy is lower
than the present value of the contribution:
Vt
exp(2.33σ)
≤ Pt
(1 + rf ,t )T −t−1 . (9.5)
In this formula,22 σ stands for the monthly volatility of the mutual fund
units backing the pension account. The volatility must be estimated from
historical time series returns of the fund unit prices using a window between
2 and 5 years. If the policy consists of more than one type of mutual fund
(e.g. equity and bond funds), σ is computed as the weighted sum of the
individual fund volatilities according to the asset allocation of the policy.
The economic rationale behind this formula is as follows. At every point
in time, the IPA issuer has the safe investment alternative of investing some
part of the contributions in zero bonds, so that at the end of the investment
period at time T the proceeds would equal the participant’s contributions
during the accumulation phase. The necessary amount to meet the total
contribution guarantee of Pt at time t is Pt/(1 + rf ,t )T −t , which is the right
hand side of formula (9.5). If the provider does not use zero bonds, but
instead employs only stocks to back the IPA, nothing happens as long as the
cash value of the policy is ‘‘substantially’’ higher than the present value of the
contributions. ‘‘Substantially’’ higher means, under the German solvency
rule, that given a current cash value of Vt there is a probability of only
1 percent (note 2.33 is the 99 percent quantile of the standard normal
distribution) that the uncertain cash value of the policy one month later
Vt+1 is lower than the present value of the contributions. This explains the
risk adjustment on the left hand side of the solvency formula.
Hence, without capital requirements, an underfunding of the principal
liability during the accumulation period is possible. The amount to which
such an underfunding is allowed depends on the volatility of the pension
assets and the time remaining to the end of the accumulation period. For
example (see Table 9-1), if the monthly returns of the pension assets have a
volatility of 7.22 percent per month, which when annualized is about 25 per-
cent per year (a typical value for German stock funds), the risk-free interest
rate is 4 percent p.a., and the remaining accumulation period is 30 years
(360 months), then the critical level is only 35.8 percent. This means that
as long as the cash value of the policy exceeds 35.8 percent of the contri-
bution paid into the plan, no risk-based-solvency capital is necessary. If the
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TABLE 9-1 Critical Level of Under Funding (as Percent of Contributions) with
respect to the Solvency Formula (9.5)
Volatility (% per month)
End of plan (Years) 0.29 0.58 0.87 1.15 1.44 2.89 5.77 7.22
30 30.5 30.7 30.9 31.1 31.3 32.4 34.6 35.8
25 37.2 37.5 37.7 38.0 38.2 39.5 42.3 43.7
20 45.4 45.8 46.1 46.4 46.7 48.3 51.6 53.4
15 55.5 55.9 56.2 56.6 57.0 59.0 63.1 65.2
10 67.8 68.2 68.7 69.1 69.6 72.0 77.0 79.6
5 82.7 83.3 83.8 84.4 85.0 87.9 94.0 97.2
3 89.6 90.2 90.8 91.4 92.0 95.2 101.8 105.3
2 93.3 93.9 94.5 95.2 95.8 99.1 106.0 109.6
1 97.1 97.7 98.4 99.0 99.7 103.1 110.3 114.1
Source: Authors’ computations.
time to retirement is only 5 years (60 months), the critical level increases
to 97.2 percent. However, the provider has the possibility of reducing the
volatility of the IPA and the possible amount of underfunding by investing
more of the pension assets in low volatility assets such as bonds.
In summary, with an appropriate asset allocation and depending on the
age of the participant, it is possible for the provider of mutual fund-based IPA
to avoid capital requirements without jeopardizing the credibility of the prin-
cipal guarantee. However, the burden of such a conditional solvency system
is the implementation of an efficient risk monitoring system for each IPA.
Hedging Costs and Hedging Effectiveness of
Mutual Fund Products
In view of our results concerning the long-run risks of pure stock invest-
ments, and given the regulatory environment placing a significant capital
charge on a fund with too much shortfall risk, it is clear that a sensible
strategy for a mutual fund must contain some element of risk management
or hedging. As mentioned above, the problem is to provide sufficient credib-
ility for promised payments (hedging effectiveness), while at the same time
reducing the upside potential of the investment as little as possible, to keep
hedging costs low. Note that the term ‘‘hedging costs’’ refers neither to the
regulatory capital the mutual fund company has to provide, nor to potential
expenditures for the purchase of derivative contracts. The only source of
hedging costs for the products considered below is a reduction in average
expected wealth or, equivalently, in the total return on the contributions
paid into the IPA.
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Because of the substantial positive correlation of the financial assets back-
ing the pension plans, an IPA provider cannot manage the risk resulting
from guarantees by using traditional insurance pooling techniques.23 Hence
it is necessary to manage underlying risk of the principal guarantee for each
IPA individually.
Methodology
Focusing on products currently offered by German mutual fund companies,
we compare them to the simple strategies of investing in stocks or bonds
exclusively. In total, we analyze five strategies with respect to their long-run
risk-return profile.
Pure Stock Strategy
This strategy was discussed above with respect to its long-run risks. Given
the parameter values used in our simulation study, this strategy is likely to
produce the highest expected wealth at the end of the investment period.
On the other hand, this strategy can be quite costly for the mutual fund
company if it must put up substantial solvency capital to render credible its
payment promises.
Pure Bond Strategy
A pure bond strategy follows the opposite approach. To reduce the risk of
falling short of the promised wealth at the end of the accumulation period,
this strategy invests only in bonds or broadly diversified government bond
portfolios. One might expect that this reduces or even completely eliminates
the shortfall risk, but this benefit also comes at the cost of lower expected
returns.
Static Portfolio Strategy
This strategy is a mixture of the pure bond and the pure stock strategy. The
portfolio remains unchanged over the whole period, and it contains both
stocks and bonds from the start. With reference to the typical asset allocation
of German retirement funds (AS-Funds),24 our simulations for the 15-year
horizon use an equally weighted stock and bond portfolio, whereas for the
30-year investment period we use 75 percent stocks and 25 percent bonds.
Life Cycle Strategy
Popular advice often given to investors is to alter the portfolio composition
with age. People are usually advised to hold a larger share of the portfolio in
stocks when young, and then to shift into bonds later on. The idea behind
this strategy is that it would be hard to compensate unfavorable movements
on the stock market occurring late in the accumulation period, since little
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time is left, so that this type of risk could be avoided by investing in bonds.
The life cycle strategy is an unconditional ‘‘hedge’’ in the sense that more
volatile return opportunities are generally considered too dangerous late in
the investment period, irrespective of the performance of stocks before the
rebalancing date. We implement this strategy by defining fixed points in time
at which the portfolio composition is changed, with more and more weight
on bonds instead of stocks. The exact dates and compositions are as follows:
For an investment horizon of 15 years, the plan is assumed to start with
40 percent of the allocations going into equity and 60 percent into bonds.
After 5 years this allocation changes, and for the remaining time 10 percent
go into stocks and 90 percent into bonds. In the case of a 30-year plan, there
is an initial period of 10 years with pure stock investment, followed by 5 years
with an allocation of 70 percent equity and 30 percent bonds. After another
5 years, the allocation of the contributions is again changed to 40 percent
equity and 60 percent bonds. Over the remaining 10 years, 90 percent of
the contributions go into bond funds and the remaining 10 percent into
stocks.
Conditional Hedging Strategy
This strategy aims at combining the performance advantage of a pure stock
strategy with the risk-reducing effect of a pure bond strategy. As opposed
to the life cycle strategy, however, the decision to shift from one investment
into the other is not driven by an exogenous variable like age, but rather
by the performance of the respective investments. For this reason, such a
strategy represents a ‘‘conditional hedging’’ approach. Usually one starts
out with a pure stock investment and shifts to bonds as soon as a certain
critical level of wealth is reached. In this case, subsequent contributions go
in bonds until the safety level is again exceeded, when the strategy switches
back to a 100 percent stock investment. An important parameter for this
type of strategy is the critical level of wealth at which the investment rule (for
subsequent contributions) changes. To link this critical value to the inter-
vention line set by the regulatory authorities in Germany (see equation 9.5),
we set the critical level of wealth (as an example) to 75 percent above the
intervention value defined according to the solvency equation (9.5).
A possibility not discussed up to now is the use of derivative assets to pro-
tect the value of an investment plan against shortfall risk. The appropriate
instrument here would be a put option on the value of the plan, with a strike
price equal to the sum of the nominal payments. However, the application
of put options in this context is not without problems. First of all, due to the
very long maturity of the savings plans, any option would be very expensive,
and the cost would have to be paid up front (at the beginning of the accumu-
lation period) which raises financing questions. Second, it seems unlikely
that a put with such a long time to maturity would be offered at all, so that a
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roll-over strategy would become necessary with all the risks involved in terms
of prices and liquidity. Third, for the put option to be of real value to the
institution holding it, the seller would have to demonstrate that it could actu-
ally cover its liabilities at the end of the accumulation period. In practice,
there would always be doubts concerning the actual risk-reduction poten-
tial of such an option. Finally, there is a significant operational problem
in using put options, since all the accounts have to be protected individu-
ally. This means that for every IPA, the provider would have to hold a put
option with the appropriate strike price and time to maturity. This seems too
costly and complicated for the typical institution, so that hedging strategies
using ‘‘physical’’ financial derivatives will not be considered further in the
following analysis.
We analyze the five strategies described above in terms of wealth levels
(or total returns) and required regulatory capital. Since there are no closed-
form expressions for the statistics of interest, we use Monte Carlo simulation
to generate a large number of paths for the evolution of the savings plans.
The relevant statistics for total returns (relative to a benchmark) and regu-
latory capital are then evaluated on the basis of these scenarios. The key
ingredient in such a simulation is a suitable model to describe the dynamics
of the relevant funds and the short rate of interest. For the funds we use
the standard capital market model, representing asset price movements
by means of correlated Wiener processes. The dynamics of the short rate
are given by the one-factor model suggested by Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross
(1985). While we assume constant correlations between the risk factors, the
covariances will vary due to the fact that the conditional standard deviation
for the short rate will in general not be equal to the unconditional value.
The time series used to estimate the process parameters (mean returns,
volatilities, correlations) are the monthly log returns of the German stock
index DAX representing the stock index fund, the log returns of the bond
performance index REXP as the bond index fund as well as the 1-year
interest rate as a proxy for the short rate. Parameters were estimated via
a maximum-likelihood approach, the estimates are presented in Tables 9-2
and 9-3. As discussed above we subtracted the equivalent of 0.5 percent
p.a. from the monthly average return on the investments to take potential
administration costs into account.
The CIR process is very popular in interest rate modeling. This is mainly
due to the fact that it is able to generate both mean-reversion in interest
rates as well as non-negative rates with probability one. Since the process
exhibits mean-reversion, the sign of the drift component (i.e. the expected
change in the short rate over the next time interval) depends on whether
the process is currently above or below its long-run mean. How quickly
the process reverts back to this long-run mean is determined by the speed
of mean-reversion. In Table9-3, κ (kappa) represents this speed of mean
reversion, θ (theta) stands for the long-run mean of the interest rate, while
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TABLE 9-2 Descriptive Statistics for Risk Factors in Germany
from January, 1973 to December, 2001
Asset Mean (% p.m.) Volatility (% p.m.) Correlations
Stocks Bonds
Stocks 0.7967 5.5800 1 0.2051
Bonds 0.5683 1.1200 1
Source: Authors’ computations.
TABLE 9-3 Descriptive Statistics for the German Short Rate
Process from January, 1973 to December, 2001
κ θ σ Correlations Innovations with
Stock Returns Bond Returns
0.1494 0.0539 0.0511 0.1417 −0.7009
The process estimated is the CIR process drt = κ(θ −rt )dt +σ√rt dWt ,
where κ is the speed of mean-reversion, θ is the long-run mean of the
short rate, and σ is the volatility of changes in the short rate. dWt is
the increment of a standard Wiener process.
Source: Authors’ computations.
σ (sigma) denotes the volatility of changes in the short rate. The market
price of interest rate risk was set equal to zero for reasons of simplicity.
To ensure stability of the simulation results, we base our analysis
on 3,000,000 simulations for each of the respective strategies. We then
compute:
(1) statistics related to hedging costs: the mean of the total return gen-
erated by the respective strategies for the different points in time
(months);
(2) statistics related to hedging effectiveness: the shortfall risk and the
required regulatory capital for the respective strategies.
The model assumes equal contributions into the plan occurring at the
beginning of each month, and a front-end load of 5 percent proportional
to the unit price for the stock fund and 3 percent for the bond fund. These
loads are comparable to the current German mutual fund fee structure.
Vi ,t denotes the uncertain total wealth of the IPA in month t(t = 1, . . . , T )
in simulation run i(i = 1, . . . , n), and zi ,t represents the critical level of
wealth in month t according to formula (9.5) determined by the BAKred.25
If Pt represents the sum of payments into the plan until time t , the average
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compounded (multiyear) return (EWt ) of the IPA at the end of month t is
given by:
EWt = 1n
n∑
i=1
Vi ,t − Pt
Pt
. (9.6)
The probability of a solvency capital charge (CPt ) in month t is estimated by:
CPt = 1n
n∑
i=1
max[zi ,t − Vi ,t ]0I(−∞,zi ,t )(Vi ,t ), (9.7)
where the indicator variable I(a,b)(X ) is equal to one if X ∈ (a, b) and zero
otherwise. The mean solvency capital charge (MCt ) at time t month after
the beginning of the plan normalized by the sum of the contributions Pt
paid into the IPA, is given by
MCt = 1n
n∑
i=1
Ci ,t
Pt
. (9.8)
According to the regulatory authorities, the solvency capital charge Ci ,t
depends on how far the mutual funds based IPA wealth falls short of the
critical level. The rule says that the capital charge is at least 8 percent when
wealth falls below the critical level. If the amount of the shortfall exceeds
8 percent, the capital charge is increased accordingly to cover the gap.
Hence Ci ,t must to be calculated according to the following formula:
Ci ,t =


0.08 · Pt 0 < 1 − Vi ,t/zi ,t ≤ 0.08
(1 − Vi ,t/zi ,t ) · Pt 1 − Vi ,t/zi ,t > 0.08
0 1 − Vi ,t/zi ,t < 0
. (9.9)
The mean conditional capital charge (MCCt ) at month t given that a capital
charge has occured is computed according to:
MCCt = MCt/CPt. (9.10)
Results
Our results for the expected total return of savings plans based on the dif-
ferent investment strategies are given in Table 9-4. It is no surprise that the
pure stock strategy does best in terms of this measure, since stocks have the
highest expected monthly return. This also causes the differences between
the respective strategies to increase with time. Nevertheless, it is interesting
to note how close the conditional hedge strategy comes in terms of expected
total return. Even after 30 years, the difference to the pure stock strategy
is only about 3.5 percent of the contributions paid. This can be taken as a
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TABLE 9-4 Expected Total Return in Germany (in % of contributions)
Year 1 5 10 15 30
100% bond
0.80 16.26 40.17 70.67 225.38
(0.80) (16.26) (40.17) (70.67) (---)
100% stock
1.38 29.09 78.78 154.06 731.60
(1.38) (29.09) (78.78) (154.06) (---)
Static
1.72 26.31 68.79 130.38 554.59
(1.08) (22.44) (58.03) (107.36) (---)
Life cycle
1.38 29.09 78.78 140.13 384.93
(1.03) (21.39) (46.73) (81.36) (---)
Conditional hedge
1.38 29.09 78.77 153.93 728.06
(1.33) (26.07) (67.40) (126.54) (---)
The table gives the expected total compounded return for the different IPA
plans at different points in time for a 30-year accumulation period (numbers in
parentheses are for an accumulation period of 15 years). For example, an entry
of 16.26 for the 100 percent bond strategy in year 5 means that the value of an IPA
with an investment horizon of 30 years is after 5 years on average 16.26 percent
higher than the sum of the contributions over the first 5 years.
Source: Authors’ computations.
first indication that this type of strategy might be an interesting compromise
between the return potential of a pure stock strategy and the risk-avoiding
property of a pure bond approach.
Nevertheless, expected wealth is just one measure to be considered; any
sensible comparison of the given products must also focus on risk measures.
The risk of the different strategies is measured by the regulatory capital
charge that the mutual fund company adopting these strategies would face.
Table 9-5 indicates that, for an investment horizon of 30 years, no regu-
latory capital is needed over the first 5 years for any of the strategies. The
pure bond strategy can even be regarded as entirely risk-free with respect
to regulatory capital charges. The life cycle approach also exhibits very low
capital charges on average. This strategy seems to be an interesting altern-
ative to a pure bond investment, given its advantage in terms of expected
return.
As expected, the pure stock strategy balances its high return potential
with an ‘‘expensive’’ regulatory capital level. It requires more than three
times the regulatory capital than the conditional hedge strategy, which
is in second place with respect to this criterion. Furthermore, Table 9-5
provides insight into the impact of the investment horizon. Long-term
strategies generally exhibit lower risk than the 15-year plans with the
only exception being the life cycle strategy. The fundamental reason for
longer-term strategies requiring less regulatory capital than shorter-term
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TABLE 9-5 Mean Regulatory Capital Charge in Germany (as %
of Contributions)
Strategy Year
1 5 10 15 30
100% bond
0 0 0 0 0
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
100% stock
0 0 <0.01 0.01 0.28
(0) (0.07) (0.68) (1.67) (---)
Static
0 0 0 0.01 0.04
(0) (0) (0.01) (0.08) (---)
Life cycle
0 0 <0.01 <0.01 0
(0) (0) (0) (<0.01) (---)
Conditional hedge
0 0 <0.01 <0.01 0.08
(0) (<0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (---)
The table gives the average regulatory capital that has to be put up for
the different IPA plans at different points in time for a 30-year accumu-
lation period (numbers in parentheses are for an accumulation period
of 15 years). For example, an entry of 0.04 for the static strategy in year
30 means that in this year on average 0.04 percent of the contributions
made over 30 years have to be provided as regulatory capital.
Source: Authors’ computations.
strategies is the discounting embedded in the critical solvency ratio set
by the regulatory authorities. This means that the required minimum
wealth level of a plan is lower, when the remaining time to maturity of
the plan is longer. For the life cycle strategy, however, there are two
effects to be considered. For the shorter horizon plan, the period of
pure stock investment is rather short, so the risk in general decreases.
To take the most pronounced example for the usual impact of the
investment horizon, consider the pure stock strategy. The average cap-
ital increases dramatically compared to the 30-year plan, so that this
approach looks very costly when it is implemented over this short investment
horizon.
The probability that the mutual fund company will be required to put
capital aside is given in Table 9-6, and the results are qualitatively similar to
Table 9-5. The pure bond strategy never forces the provider to put up capital,
whereas the pure stock does with a significant likelihood. Again, time is an
important factor here. For the 30-year horizon, the probability of a capital
charge for any strategy never exceeds 1.4 percent, but for a 15-year pure
stock plan, this probability is almost 9 percent at the end of the investment
period. For the other strategies, the ratios of 15- to 30-year probabilities are
also quite high, so that if a plan actually exhibits the risk of a capital charge,
this risk tends to increase for shorter horizons.
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TABLE 9-6 Probability of a Regulatory Capital Charge in
Germany (in %)
Strategy Year
1 5 10 15 30
100% bond
0 0 0 0 0
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
100% stock
0 0 <0.01 0.07 1.40
(0) (0.67) (4.78) (8.98) (---)
Static
0 0 0 <0.01 0.25
(0) (0) (0.06) (0.74) (---)
Life cycle
0 0 <0.01 <0.01 0
(0) (0) (0) (<0.01) (---)
Conditional hedge
0 0 <0.01 0.01 0.64
(0) (<0.01) (0.08) (0.62) (---)
The table gives the average frequency (or probability) of the event that
regulatory capital has to be put up for the different IPA plans at different
points in time for a 30-year accumulation period (numbers in parentheses
are for an accumulation period of 15 years). For example, an entry of
0.07 for the 100 percent stock strategy in year 15 means that in this year in
0.07 percent of the cases regulatory capital had to be provided. Numbers
in parentheses represent results for an investment horizon of 15 years.
Source: Authors’ computations.
We also note that there is an important difference between shortfall prob-
ability and the probability of a regulatory capital charge. As shown above, the
shortfall probability of a pure stock investment actually falls with a longer
investment horizon, whereas the probability of a capital charge goes up.
Again this is due to the fact that the critical level of wealth set by the German
regulatory authorities contains a discounting component. Thus this critical
level will go up with decreasing time to maturity, thereby causing a higher
likelihood for a capital charge.
The average conditional regulatory capital charge depicted in Table 9-7
shows how much capital will be needed given that the cash value of the
IPA falls below the critical BaKred value. Note that when the empirical
probability of a capital charge is zero, this measure is not defined. The
Table shows results qualitatively similar to the general long run risk-return
profile of the various asset classes. The risk of a pure stock strategy becomes
obvious, since if regulatory capital is needed, it will probably be a significant
amount. For example, at the end of 30 years the mutual fund company would
need on average almost 20 percent of the contributions as regulatory capital
in those scenarios where wealth falls below the critical BaKred value. The
benefits of flexibility become obvious when the static strategy is compared
with the conditional hedge. The conditional hedge produces, on average,
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TABLE 9-7 Mean Conditional Regulatory Capital Charge in Germany (as
% of Contributions)
Strategy Year
1 5 10 15 30
Pure bond
n.def. n.def. n.def. n.def. n.def.
(n.def.) (n.def.) (n.def.) (n.def.) (n.def.)
Pure stock
n.def. n.def. 9.46 11.59 19.90
(n.def.) (9.92) (14.31) (18.63) (---)
Static
n.def. n.def. n.def. 9.31 14.71
(n.def.) (n.def.) (8.75) (10.17) (---)
Life-cycle
n.def. n.def. 9.46 8.04 n.def.
(n.def.) (n.def.) (n.def.) (8.00) (---)
Conditional Hedge
n.def. n.def. 8.00 9.00 13.29
(n.def.) (8.06) (8.90) (9.95) (---)
The table gives the average conditional regulatory capital that has to be put up for
the different IPA plans at different points in time for a 30 year accumulation period
(numbers in parentheses are for an accumulation period of 15 years), that is, the
average amount of regulatory capital that is necessary, given that regulatory capital
has to be put up at all. For example, an entry of 9.00 for the conditional hedge strategy
in year 15 means that in this year on average 9.00 percent of the sum of contributions
over the first 15 years had to be provided as regulatory capital in those cases where
capital had to be put up at all. Note that this number is not defined (‘n.def.’), if the
empirical probability of having to provide regulatory capital is equal to zero.
Source: Authors’ computations.
higher wealth over the whole investment period and the average conditional
regulatory capital is also lower. So if one were to compare the different
products on the basis of these two measures only, the static strategy would
be dominated. Note, however, that the probability of a capital charge is
lower for the static strategy.
The analyses thus far focus on the statistical output, but it is also import-
ant to assess the administrative costs generated by each plan. Cost will not
be major for the strategy products such as the pure bond, the pure stock
plans, the static, and the life cycle strategies. However, for the conditional
hedge, the need to shift incoming distributions across asset classes depend-
ing on how much wealth has been accumulated in the plan, might imply
considerable administrative effort. It is therefore of interest to examine the
relative frequency of shifts from one asset class to the other, when a condi-
tional hedge strategy is run. Here again, time is an important factor, since
for the 15-year plan the mutual fund company must change the asset class
in 98 percent of the paths generated by the simulation, whereas this need
arises in only 26 percent of the cases for the longer horizon. In any case,
costs must be taken into account when strategies are compared with respect
to their practical application.
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In summary, it is not possible to identify the overall dominating investment
product or strategy. With a few exceptions, higher potential in terms of
average wealth usually comes at the cost of higher regulatory capital. It is
important in this context to look at the average amount of regulatory capital
conditional on the event that capital actually has to be put aside. Here it
becomes obvious that strategies with a fixed stock investment can produce
significant risks. This risk is mitigated when the conditional hedge strategy is
employed. Nevertheless, additional administrative cost must be considered.
Conclusions
Due to the severe financing problems of standard pay-as-you-go pension sys-
tems in many countries, alternative vehicles for retirement financing have to
be developed. In Germany, such a new system was installed when the German
Retirement Saving Act was passed by the legislative body. The government
offers significant tax relief for investment products meeting certain require-
ments, the most important of these being a guarantee promising that the
cash value of the IPA at the end of the accumulation period will be at least
as high as the nominal sum of the contributions. To lend sufficient cred-
ibility to the payment promises made by institutions providing investment
products for these savings plans, the regulatory authorities in Germany have
imposed a capital charge in case the value of the savings plan falls below a
certain critical level.
At first sight, it seems that in order to implement such a principal guar-
antee, complicated and expensive financial products like derivatives are
needed. However, as we have shown, there are other ways of achieving a
sometimes practically risk-free position without using options or similar
instruments. We analyze in detail various strategies aimed at combining
the potentially return-increasing properties of equity investment with the
risk-reducing characteristics of bond investments. These strategies offer a
real-world application of the tools and methods of capital market theory.
Of course, the trade off between return and risk is always at the core of
the analysis. Yet in the context of this chapter it is important to recognize
that variance is not the most important measure of risk. As opposed to a
more traditional approach we consider shortfall and the need of regulatory
capital as the two most important types of risk.
The strategies analyzed here range from simple pure bond or equity
investments, to mixed equity-bond funds and products offering a change
in portfolio composition at pre-defined points in time, to highly sophistic-
ated products with conditionally changing investment styles. One of the key
results of our study is that these dynamic strategies, switching from stocks
into bonds whenever the value of the savings plan falls below some critical
solvency ratio set by regulatory authorities, perform rather well in terms of
expected total returns for long investment horizons. They come close to
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pure stock investments with respect to the average value they generate for
the investor. However, it is also very important for the financial institution
to keep an eye on the expected amount of regulatory capital required by
a certain investment strategy. Due to the conditional change in allocation
when the critical regulatory value is reached, the expected capital charge is
significantly smaller than in the case of a pure equity investment.
Besides the basic type of strategy, the length of the investment horizon
is an important factor for the risks and rewards of alternative strategies.
In general, the longer the maturity of the plan, the lower the expected
capital charge, since the critical level set by the authorities in Germany con-
tains a discount factor, the higher the expected total return. Nevertheless,
it is important to consider other risk variables as well in this. We are far
from claiming that one of the strategies discussed here should be seen as
uniformly superior to any other. Rather we seek to point out the benefits
and risks offered by the different types of products, to provide a basis for a
thorough discussion of the issues involved in product design and regulation.
Appendix
Derivation of the Solvency Formula
Consider an investment plan where payments into an IPA are made at equally
spaced points in time t = 0, 1, . . . , T (e.g. months). Let Pt denote the sum
of payments up to time t , T the planned terminal date of the plan (equal
to the beginning of the payout phase), and q(rf ,t , T − t) = (1 + rf ,t )t−T the
discount factor with risk-free rate rf ,t and remaining time to maturity T − t .
Without loss of generality we assume that the investor holds exactly one
share of the fund at time t . We are interested in the solvency ratio Vt/Pt at
time t , which makes sure that the uncertain market value of the shares Vt+1
at time t + 1 is less than the sum of payments Pt into the plan discounted
up to time T , that is, less than Pt · q(rf ,t , T − t − 1), with a probability of at
most ε.
To be able to quantify this shortfall risk, we have to specify a model for
the random evolution of the value of the investment shares. Here we make
the standard assumption that the dynamics of this value can be described
by a geometric Brownian motion. This implies that the relative change in
value (i.e. the log-return) ln(Vt+1) − ln(Vt ) is normally distributed with
mean µ und variance σ 2. Formally we obtain the desired solvency ratio
as the solution of the following inequality:
Prob[Vt+1 < Pt · q(rf ,t , T − t − 1)]
= Prob[ln(Vt+1) < ln(Pt · q(rf ,t , T − t − 1))] ≤ ε (9.A1)
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Using the above distributional assumption inequality (9.A1) is equivalent to
ln(Vt ) + µ ≥ ln(Pt ) + ln[q(rf ,t , T − t − 1)] + N1−ε · σ , (9.A2)
where N1−ε is the (1 − ε)-quantile of the cumulative standard normal
distribution. Under the additional (conservative) assumption26 that the
one-period expected return is equal to zero (i.e µ = 0) inequality (9.A2)
can be written as
Vt/ exp[N1−ε · σ ] ≥ Pt · q(rf ,t , T − t − 1). (9.A3)
Setting N1−ε = 2.33, which implies a tolerated shortfall probability of not
more than 1 percent, this represents the equation (9.5) for the solvency
ratio presented in the main text.
Notes
1This Act is also known as ‘‘Riester Reform.’’ Walter Riester was the German Labor
Minister responsible for the reform of the pension system in the year 2001. More
formally, the reform as a whole alters several existing laws including (among others)
the social security law, the income tax law, the occupational pensions law, the social
welfare law, the civil law, the law governing investment management companies, and
the law governing insurance companies.
2Similar to that, the maximum pension for civil servants is being reduced from
75% to 71.75% of the last salary.
3In addition, the government also promotes the ‘‘second pillar’’ occupational
pension system, for example, by establishing a new funding vehicle called ‘‘Pen-
sionsfonds.’’
4An exemption is, that a part of the pension plan (min¤ 10,000 and max.¤ 50,000)
can be withdrawn during the accumulation phase to finance own house. This amount
must be paid back (at a zero interest rate) into the IPA before the beginning of the
distribution phase.
5In the case of a life annuity the provider must promise lifelong constant or increas-
ing (monthly) payments to the annuitant. In the case of a capital withdrawal plan
(typically offered by mutual fund and/or bank providers) at least 60% of the accu-
mulated assets (but not less than the contributions paid into the IPA) must be used
for constant or rising periodic payments. At latest at the age of 85 the balance must
revert into a life annuity, whereas the benefits cannot be less than the last payment
received before that age. In addition, not more than 40% of the accumulated assets
can be used for a withdrawal plan with variable pension payments (reflecting the
return of a specific asset portfolio).
6Especially for traditional life insurance policies, it is conventional (until now)
that distribution costs are charged as front end loads on the first premiums (via
the so-called zillmer-adjustment) resulting in no or low early cash values for the
policyholder.
7An exemption are financial derivatives (e.g. option, futures, swaps), which can be
used within an IPA for hedging purposes only.
8Not more than 15% of total contributions can be deducted from the principal
guarantee level, if the IPA include insurance coverage against disability. In the case
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of a switch to a new provider during the accumulation phase, the policyholder gets
from the new provider a guarantee on the policy’s cash value at the time of transfer
plus new premiums.
9See also Lachance and Mitchell (Chapter 8, this volume).
10For surveys cf. Albrecht, Maurer, and Ruckpaul (2001) and Kritzman and Rich
(1998).
11Cf. Bodie (2001) and Bodie (2002) for a critique of these simple arguments.
12The concept of shortfall risk was introduced in finance by Roy (1952) and Kataoka
(1963), expanded and theoretically justified by Bawa (1975), and Fishburn (1977,
1982, 1984). It is widely applied to investment asset allocation by Leibowitz, Bader,
and Kogelman (1996) and used by Albrecht, Maurer, and Ruckpaul (2001), Asness
(1996), Butler and Domian (1991), Leibowitz and Krasker (1988) and Zimmermann
(1991) to judge the long term risk of stocks and bonds.
13The MEL is closely connected with the tail conditional expectation, which is given
by TCE = E(R | R < z) = z − MEL. The TCE has some favourable features,
for example, it is (in contrast to the shortfall probability) a coherent risk meas-
ure with respect to the axioms developed by Artzner et al. (1999). In addition
the MEL is a suitable version of the mean excess---respectively mean excess loss-
function E(X − z | X > z) considered in extreme value theory. For extreme-value
methods in financial risk management cf. Borkovic and Klüppelberg (2000) and
Embrechts, Resnick, and Samorodnitsky (1999). Very early, Gürtler (1929) intro-
duced the MEL as ‘‘Mathematisches Risiko’’ to evaluate the underwriting risk of
insurance companies.
14The Black and Scholes formula follows directly only for a single lump sum pen-
sion payment and not for a series of contributions; see also Lachance and Mitchell
(Chapter 8, this volume).
15As shown by Albrecht, Maurer, and Ruckpaul (2001) the risk measures can be
derived analytically in the case of a lump-sum investment.
16Feldstein, Ranguelova, and Samwick (2001: 60) use a similar procedure to account
for potential administration costs.
17The large number of simulation paths is necessary to receive a precise picture of
the worst case risk measure MEL, especially when the shortfall probability is low.
18Despite the fact that the expected return is the most common measure of the
‘‘reward,’’ ‘‘return,’’ or ‘‘value’’ of financial investments it is---especially in a downside
risk context---possible to measure the upside potential more directly, c.f. Holthausen
(1981) or Albrecht, Maurer, and Möller (1998). AQ:
Albrecht et
al (1998)
not listed
pls chk
19According to German Investment Company Law (KAGG), the minimum equity
capital for investment fund management companies (i.e. the provider of the pension
products) is ¤ 2.5 Millions.
20Since May of 2002 the BAKred is a Department of the new German Federal
Financial Supervisory Agency.
21In addition to the solvency equity capital, investment management companies
must build supplementary reserves, if the difference between the present value of
the contributions and the risk adjusted cash value of the policy exceeds 8% of the
total contributions.
22The formula is explained in more detail in Appendix B.
23See also Lachance and Mitchell (Chapter 8, this volume).
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24AS-Funds (Altersvorsorge-Sondervermögen) are special mutual fund products
regulated in the Investment Management Company Act, which the German gov-
ernment introduced in 1998 for retirement saving. In contrast to usual balanced
funds, AS-Funds can invest into real estate, require a saving plan of at least 18 years,
and are subject to some quantitative investment restrictions. For more details see
Laux and Siebel (1999).
25C.f. BAKred (2001).
26This assumption is indeed conservative, since it increases the shortfall probability
compared to the common case µ > 0. Furthermore it is no longer necessary to
estimate expected returns (e.g. from historical time series), which are subject to
much larger estimation risks than volatilities. See, for example, Merton (1980).
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